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NASA, like the other hazardous industries, has suffered very catastrophic losses. 
Human error will likely never be completely eliminated as a factor in our failures.   
When you can’t eliminate risk, focus on mitigating the worst consequences and recovering operations.  
Bolstering processes to emphasize the role of integration and problem solving is key to success. 
Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters skill-based performance that minimizes risk and encourages 
successful engagement. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170006515 2019-08-31T07:11:17+00:00Z
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“It can only be attributable to human error.“
-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)
Words of Wisdom
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Optimizing Processes to Minimize Risk
• NASA’s Losses in Space and on the Ground 
– Failure is not an option we choose, but it is a reality we must face….
• Safety & Mission Assurance in the Project Life-Cycle
– The Unique Role of the “Integration Engineer” and “Chief SMA Officer”
• Accommodating Human Error
– Acknowledging human frailty and modeling error probabilities.
• NASA’s Safety Culture – Minimizing the Risk 
Environment
– Reducing error by cultivating skill-based behavior.
– Bolstering trust throughout operations.
– Measuring safety culture growth.
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Recent Mission Mishaps
NASA’s Losses
Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
• 7 fatalities; 
• $3 Billion vehicle loss;
• 2.5 year mission impact. 
NOAA N-Prime, 
September 6, 
2003:
• $135 Million 
vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission 
impact. 
Genesis,  September 8, 2004:
• Some sample retrieval materials lost.
DART, April 16, 2005:
• Proximity operations 
mission objectives 
lost. 
OCO, February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 
2011:
• $424 Million 
vehicle loss;
• ??? mission 
impact. 
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NASA’s Losses
MSFC Freedom Star Tow-wire Injury, December 12, 2006
• Hospitalization due to internal injuries from impact with SRB 
tow-wire.
Location Where Deceased 
Fell From Roof
Second Point of 
Impact of Deceased
First Point of Impact 
of Deceased
KSC Roofing Fatality, 
March 17, 2006
• Subcontractor died 
from head injuries 
suffered due to fall.
JSC Chamber B 
Asphyxiation, 
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder 
injury due to 
asphyxiation 
and fall.
WFF CNC Injury, 
October 28, 2010
• Sub-dermal 
tissue damage 
due to impact 
from machine 
tool shrapnel.
Recent Institutional Mishaps
June 27, 2017 David T. Loyd 5
Project 
Authorization
Program/Customer
Agreement
System 
Requirements
Review
Preliminary 
Design Review
Critical 
Design Review
Test 
Readiness
Review(s)
Qualification
Testing
Acceptance
Testing
Delivery &
Activation
Key Milestones
Project 
Closeout 
System/Facility 
Decommission
Performance
Review(s)
Major Tasks
• Program/Project Plans
• Feasibility Studies
• Trade Studies
• Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis
• Risk Identification
• Configuration 
Management Plans
• Requirements 
Identification
• Standards & Specifications 
Identification
Concept & 
Requirements 
Phase
Major Tasks
• Design Review
• Drawing/Configuration 
Development
• Verification/Validation 
Planning
• Supplier Assessment
• Failure Modes & Effects 
Analysis
• Probabilistic Risk 
Modelling and Assessment
• Prototype Development
• Procurement Specification
• Test Planning  
Design & 
Development 
Phase
Major Tasks
• Work Authorization 
Documentation Issuance
• Parts & Assembly 
Inspection
• Process Instruction 
Development
• Component and Assembly 
Testing
• Nonconformance Review
• Acceptance Data Package 
Compilation
• “As Built” Configuration 
Management
Manufacturing
& Test 
Phase
Subject Matter Experts, Mission Planners, 
System Engineers
Integration Engineers, Quality Engineers, 
Safety Engineers, Analysts, Inspectors
Independent Technical Authority – Chief SMA Officer
Major Tasks
• Acceptance
• Change Requests
• Waiver/Deviation 
Review
• Operation & 
Maintenance Training
• Mission Evaluation
• Anomaly Resolution
• Logistics & 
Maintenance Planning
• Failure Analysis
• Problem Reporting & 
Corrective Action
• Lessons Learned
Operations
& Sustaining
Phase
Safety & Mission Assurance in the Project Life-Cycle
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The Role of the Integration Engineer
• Facilitates multi-discipline problem 
resolution.
• Resolves conflicts between 
compliance and functional objectives.
• Consolidates mission assurance 
objectives between component, 
assembly, subsystem, and mission 
objectives.
• Identifies potential waiver/deviation 
opportunities.
• Performs material review actions for 
acceptance of form, fit, or function.
• Researches data and validates risk 
assessment parameters.   
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The Role of the Chief SMA Officer (CSO)
• Evaluates, approves or recommends the feasibility or modification of policies, 
requirements or systems.
• Performs technical SMA assessment in support of the Certificate of Flight 
Readiness (CoFR) endorsement.
• Leads independent assessments of Program-related process integrity impacts, 
anomalies, or unique failures.
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• Formulates SMA position on 
significant technical issues or 
design trades across the Program. 
• Dispositions assigned changes, 
waivers, deviations, and 
exceptions to program technical 
requirements.
• Accepts equivalent alternatives 
to applied requirements.
Accommodating Human Error…
As much as we’d like to be able to predict error and eliminate it, the reality is 
that we must  be prepared to accommodate it – measure known performance 
characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, mitigate greatest risk, and enable 
prudent response to the next accident.
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High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight
Shuttle Astronaut
Northeast Multispecies 
Groundfish Fishing
Alaskan Commercial Fishing
Commercial Fishing
Extraction –
Mining, Oil and Gas
Construction Worker
Alaskan Commuter Pilot
Airline Pilot
Timber Cutting and Logging
Truck Driver
0 1:100 1:50 1:33
Probability
1:218
1:166
1:775
1:851
1:4420
1:4190
1:336
1:1270
1:998
1:3790
Person-Fatality Risk Per Year 
Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and 
smaller groups that drive the risk.  
Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that 
has high risk.
Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic 
illnesses like “black lung.” 
June 27, 2017
1:70Mt. Everest Climber
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Performance 
Shaping 
Factors
Organizational
Physical
EmotionalEnvironmental
Emergency 
Environment
• PSFs impact human 
performance in a variety of 
ways, such as intelligence, 
expertise, emotion, harsh 
conditions, conflicting orders, 
etc.
• PSFs are incorporated into PRA 
error modeling, accommodating 
anticipated human interaction 
with critical tasking.
• We work to minimize the affects 
of PSFs, but our expectation of 
performance must acknowledge 
their potential impact to 
operations.
Human Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) Integration 
with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
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Minimizing Human Error 
and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment 
Rasmussen’s 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing 
1. Skill-based: requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. Rule-based: driven by procedures or rules.
3. Knowledge-based: requires problem solving/decision making.
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“The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer 
rules there are for players to break.”
John Madden 
“Successful design is not the 
achievement of perfection but the 
minimization and accommodation of 
imperfection.” 
Henry Petroski
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How Safety Culture Optimizes Process Performance
• By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can 
provide our workforce with:
– Clear emphasis on continuous learning;
– Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values;
– Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on 
long-term success;
– Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and 
communicating concerns and ideas.
• Practicing an effective Safety Culture: 
– Builds Skill-based response mechanisms;
– Sharpens and shares Knowledge-based response 
mechanisms where flexibility is necessary;
– Reduces the emphasis on Rule-based response; 
– And breaks down barriers to Trust. 
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NASA’s Safety/Risk Culture Model
“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and 
behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that 
fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence 
that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with 
our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our 
mission.”
An effective safety culture is characterized by the following 
subcomponents:
Culture - We report our concerns
Culture - We have a sense of fairness
Culture - We change to meet new demands
Culture - We learn from our successes and mistakes
Culture - Everyone does his or her part 
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Apollo 1 – January 27, 1967
Reporting Culture – Procedures were subjected 
to last-minute changes that were not effectively 
tracked, recorded or communicated.
Just Culture – Poor morale and process discipline 
were evident in Command Module contractor 
performance prior to the incident.
Flexible Culture – Willingness to change course 
on design issues was weak in the presence of 
compelling important information.
Learning Culture – Test planning failed to 
appreciate the significant hazards of a 100% 
oxygen environment.
Engaged Culture – NASA provided insufficient 
surveillance over management functions.
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Reporting – With both tragedies, launch process deficiencies, such as O-ring 
susceptibility in cold temperatures (Challenger) and foam shedding (Columbia), 
were passively reported problems, yet were not considered serious hazards.
Just – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of 
an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.  
Flexible – With both incidents, the Shuttle Program was experiencing schedule 
pressure challenges. 
Learning – With “normalization of deviance,” O-ring burn-through and foam impact 
had become classified as “in-family” and as a negligible risk.
Engaged – NASA management lacked involvement in critical discussions. 
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Columbia – February 1, 2003
Challenger – January 28, 1986
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Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010
Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute 
distribution, last minute decision.
Just – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results 
were muted, not heeded or explored .
Flexible – All involved seemed prepared to exercise 
flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient 
process discipline.
Learning – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from 
Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig 
spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.
Engaged – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of 
recognition or timely control action related to kicks, 
diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard,  
reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), 
reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect 
System, BOP testing and maintenance.
June 27, 2017 David T. Loyd
NASA Safety Culture Model Applied to Deepwater Horizon
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Measuring Safety Culture
David T. Loyd
2015 Safety Culture Survey Results
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HOT
“Eliminate the recalcitrant 
dinosaur dictators”
WARM
“Emphasis on purpose of 
safety measures, not just 
filling out a form or 
checking a box.”
TEPID
“Watch out for everyone” 
“Communication”
COOL
“Keep doing what you 
are doing. We are 
constantly being 
reminded of Safety and 
its importance.”
Comment Temperature Perspectives
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The Path to a Reduced Risk Environment
• NASA, like the other hazardous industries, 
has suffered very catastrophic losses.
• Human error will likely never be completely 
eliminated as a factor in our failures.  
• When you can’t eliminate risk, focus on 
mitigating the worst consequences and 
recovering operations. 
• Bolstering processes to emphasize the role 
of integration and problem solving is key to 
success.
• Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters 
skill-based performance that minimizes risk 
and encourages successful engagement. 
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Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
7 fatalities; 
$3 Billion vehicle loss;
2.5 year mission impact. 
Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool
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NOAA N-Prime, September 6, 2003:
• $135 Million vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission impact. June 27, 2017 David T. Loyd 22
Genesis,  September 8, 2004:
• Some sample retrieval materials lost.
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Orbiting Carbon Observatory, 
February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 2011:
• $424 Million vehicle loss;
• ??? mission impact. 
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JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation,
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder injury due to 
asphyxiation and fall.
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